Contracts in informed-principal problems with moral hazard by Bedard, NC





In many cases, an employer has private information about the potential productivity
of a worker, who in turn has private information about the effort she exerts on the job.
Much of the analysis of this environment in the literature restricts the employer to offer
contracts that depend only on observable outcomes (e.g. profit). This paper studies
the advantages to the employer of offering the worker a set of potential contracts from
which the employer will choose after the worker has accepted the offer, so called menu-
contracts. Specifically, in a two-state principal-agent problem with moral hazard, I
show when the principal can obtain strictly higher expected payoffs than the restricted
contracts of the literature by offering a menu-contract.
1 Introduction
In many cases, an employer has private information about the potential productivity of a
worker, who in turn has private information about the effort she exerts on the job. For
example, a law firm may know the likelihood of winning a trial but cannot observe the effort
the attorney exerts for the case. In such situations, the employer needs to design a contract
that releases the right information at the right time to optimally exploit the information
asymmetry.
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A number of papers have analyzed the value of information in such environments; see for
example Beaudry (1994); Chade and Silvers (2002);1 Kaya (2010); Martimort et al. (2010);
and Silvers (2012); Inderst (2001) also studies this environment but does not consider the
value of the principal’s information. These papers, however, restrict the set of contracts the
principal can propose to the set of point-contracts; that is, contracts that depend only on
observable outcomes, specifically, the success or failure of the project. In this article I show
how this restriction affects the principal’s equilibrium payoffs relative to contracts that allow
the principal to condition contracts on her own private information as well. Such contracts
are called menu-contracts in the literature since they take the form of a list of contracts that
is offered to the agent from which the principal chooses after the agent has accepted.
Formally, the model is of an informed principal problem with moral hazard. The principal
cannot observe if the agent has exerted effort but does observe the outcome of the task: it can
be either a failure or a success. The task can be either productive or unproductive: exerting
effort is more likely to lead to success in the productive task than in the unproductive task.
The principal knows if the task is productive but the agent does not.
When the principal is restricted to offer only point contracts she is subject to the agent’s
arbitrary off-path posterior beliefs. For example, very inefficient point-contracts can be
supported in equilibrium by specifying that the agent’s off-path beliefs put probability one
on the principal being the worst type (from the agent’s point of view). I characterize the
lower bound equilibrium payoff for the principal when she can offer menu-contracts and
show that it is always strictly higher than the lower bound when the principal is restricted
to offer point-contracts, whenever a separating equilibrium exists in point-contracts. In
particular, when it exists, the least-cost-separating contract is the best point-contract for
the principal but achieves the lower bound equilibrium menu-contract payoff.2 This lower
bound menu-contract is belief free: it is acceptable to the agent regardless of her beliefs
1Chade and Silvers (2002) do consider more general contracts as a robustness check but mainly focus on
point-contracts. See below for more details.
2When no separating equilibrium exists, the set of point-contract equilibrium payoffs may coincide with
the set of menu-contract equilibrium payoffs.
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about the principal’s type and therefore not susceptible to punishing off-path beliefs. In this
way, menu-contracts help to refine the set of equilibria without needing to design ad-hoc
selection criteria.
Finally, I characterize environments in which separating menu-contracts exist that are
strictly better for the principal than any separating point-contract. Beaudry (1994), Chade
and Silvers (2002), and Silvers (2012) show that the best separating point-contract cedes rents
to the agent ex ante in the form of higher base wages (i.e. a flatter wage profile). I construct
a menu-contract that eliminates these signalling costs and thus reduces the principal’s wage
bill. In particular, I show that if and only if the least-cost-separating equilibrium point-
contract is strictly above the minimum wage allowed, there exists a menu-contract that
is strictly less expensive for the principal. If there is no minimum wage (i.e. the agent
has unlimited liability), then the principal should never cede rents to the agent ex ante.
Essentially, the principal can use menu-contracts to squeeze more rent from the agent by
eliminating the slack in the agent’s ex ante individual rationality constraint and transferring
it across states in a way that preserves her own incentive compatibility.
1.1 Literature
The general problem of the privately informed principal is developed in Myerson (1983); in
specialized environments with no moral hazard, Maskin and Tirole (1990, 1992) characterize
the equilibria of the model and derive their properties. In particular, Maskin and Tirole
(1992) characterize a contract that earns the principal her lower bound equilibrium payoff.
As in this paper, Segal and Whinston (2003) apply Maskin and Tirole’s methodology to
reduce the indeterminacy of equilibria in a class of bilateral contracting problems. Their
work differs from the current paper in that the private information of the principal is her
profile of trades with other agents, and therefore is endogenous in their model.
A number of papers have studied the informed principal problem with moral hazard:
for example see Beaudry (1994), Chade and Silvers (2002), Kaya (2010), Martimort et al.
3
(2010), Silvers (2012), Inderst (2001) and Wagner et al. (2015). To my knowledge, there has
not been a characterization of the equilibria in this model without restricting the principal’s
contract choice. Notably, Chade and Silvers (2002) show that the equilibrium in their result,
the least-cost-separating equilibrium, can be achieved via a menu-contract. I show that the
principal can never do worse than under this menu-contract equilibrium and, depending on
the parameters of the model, can do strictly better with another menu-contract. Wagner
et al. (2015) describe a class of informed principal problems with moral hazard wherein each
type of principal earns her first-best payoff.3 In such cases, menu-contracts cannot improve
on the best point-contract but can eliminate some inefficient point-contract equilibria.
2 Model
2.1 Preferences and Technologies
The agent is (weakly) risk averse and maximizes expected utility. Her payoff over wage
income, w ∈ [w,∞), and effort, a ∈ A := {a1, a2} ⊂ R2+, is given by U(w) − a with
U ′(w) > 0 and U ′′(w) ≤ 0. Assume that 0 ≤ a1 < a2 < ∞ and w ∈ R ∪ {−∞}. Note that
the lower bound on the set of wage offers implies limited liability for the agent if w > −∞.
Let h := U−1 denote the inverse of U .
The effort chosen induces a conditional probability distribution over the set of possible
outcomes Q := {qs, qf} ⊂ R2+ where 0 ≤ qf < qs <∞ (the subscript f denotes failure while
s denotes success). If the principal pays the agent wage w and outcome qn is realized her
payoff is qn − w.
The principal is a risk neutral expected profit maximizer who needs to hire the agent
to complete a task. Task productivity can either be high or low. Each type of task is
associated with a set of conditional probability distributions that determines the probability
3Their analysis allows the principal to offer menu-contracts but the same payoffs can be achieved using
point-contracts.
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of the task being successful given a particular effort level. The task of type i ∈ {H,L}









conditional probability distribution across Q when the effort is a ∈ A. The type-H task is
more productive than the type-L task: piHs (a2) > pi
L
s (a2) and pi
H
s (a1) ≥ piLs (a1); and higher
effort is more productive: piis(a2) > pi
i
s(a1) for i ∈ {H,L}. For example, if the attorney from
the Introduction exerts a unit of effort on an easy case she is more likely to win than if she
exerted the same unit of effort on a difficult case and, for any type of case, she is more likely
to win if she exerts effort. Let λ ∈ (0, 1) be the common prior probability that the task is
of high productivity; i.e. has conditional probability distribution ΠH . I refer to a principal
who has task type i as a type-i principal. Revenue is assumed to be sufficiently large that
there always exists at least one equilibrium in which the type-H principal hires an agent.
2.2 Contracts
A point-contract is a set of payments w = (ws, wf ) ∈ [w,∞)2 from the principal to the
agent and an effort level a ∈ A such that the principal pays the agent wn when outcome qn is
realized for n ∈ {s, f} and suggests the agent take effort level a. Let U(w) = (U(wf ), U(ws))
and vi(w, a) := pii(a) · (q−w).4
A menu-contract is direct revelation mechanism that specifies a pair of point-contracts
(wi, ai)i∈{H,L} such that wi ∈ [w,∞)2 and ai ∈ A for all i ∈ {H,L}. The principal chooses
from this set after the agent has accepted the offer.5
2.3 Information
The principal knows her type but the agent does not. Let ρ := (ρH , ρL) denote the agent’s
posterior belief over the type of the principal after observing the proposed contract. Further,
let p(a;ρ) = (ps(a;ρ), pf (a;ρ)) := ρ
HpiH(a) + ρLpiL(a) denote the agent’s expected prob-
4Where · denotes the inner product operator.
5The formal timing of the game is outlined in Section 2.4.
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ability distribution over Q conditional on having chosen effort a ∈ A where pn(a;ρ) is her
belief that outcome qn will occur conditional on having chosen effort a ∈ A for n ∈ {s, f}.
2.4 Timing















In stage 1, nature chooses the principal’s type and this is observed by the principal. In
stage 2, the principal offers the agent a contract. The agent updates her priors based on the
stage 2 offer and accepts or rejects the contract in stage 3. If the agent rejects the contract,
the principal receives zero utility and the agent receives utility U¯ . If only point-contracts
are available, the game skips to stage 5: the agent chooses her effort level, the outcome is
realized and the corresponding wage is paid. If menu-contracts are available, in stage 4 the
principal chooses from the menu-contracts and stage 5 follows as before.
2.5 Constraints
2.5.1 Point-contracts
A point-contract (w, ak), for k ∈ {1, 2} is individually rational if
p(ak;ρ) ·U(w)− ak ≥ U¯ . (IR(ρ))
The contract is incentive compatible for the agent if, for k = 2, the agent does not want to
exert low effort (
p(a2;ρ)− p(a1;ρ)
) ·U(w) ≥ a2 − a1. (AIC(ρ))
The upward constraint, which prevents her from taking high effort when the principal wants





) ·U(w) = 0; moreover, since a1−a2 < 0, w satisfies the upward
incentive constraint for k = 1. Finally, note that the optimal wage implementing low effort
will be constant across s and f : since the agent is (weakly) risk averse, for any wage w, the
constant wage equal to the certainty equivalent of w will be (weakly) cheaper for the risk
neutral principal.
A pair of point-contracts ((wH , aH), (wL, aL)) is incentive compatible for the principal if
it satisfies for all i, j ∈ {H,L}
pii(ai) · (q−wi) ≥ pii(aj) · (q−wj). (PIC(i, j))
2.5.2 Menu-contracts
Myerson’s inscrutability principle (Myerson (1983)) states that it is without loss of generality
to assume that all types of the principal offer the same menu of contracts in equilibrium.6
This implies that a menu-contract need only satisfy the agent’s individual rationality con-
straint ex ante. A menu-contract ((wH , aH), (wL, aL)) is therefore individually rational if
λ
(
piH(aH) ·U(wH)− aH)+ (1− λ) (piL(aL) ·U(wL)− aL) ≥ U¯ .
A separating menu-contract (i.e. a menu-contract (wi, ai)i∈{H,L} such that wH 6= wL or
aH 6= aL) is incentive compatible for the agent if AIC(1, 0) and AIC(0, 1) are satisfied for
i ∈ {H,L}; that is, in a separating contract, the agent’s incentive compatibility constraints
for each principal type-i must be satisfied given that the agent believes the principal’s type
is i with probability one. A pooling menu-contract is incentive compatible for the agent if
(wH , aH) = (wL, aL) and it satisfies AIC(λ, 1 − λ). Finally, a menu-contract is incentive
compatible for the principal if it satisfies PIC(i, j) for i, j ∈ {H,L}.
6Thus, the agent cannot extract any information from the principal’s offer; the principal is inscrutable
at the time of the agent’s acceptance decision.
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3 Preliminary Analysis
In this section I establish a number of benchmark equilibrium contracts and their payoffs. I
first describe the contracts that would result if the principal’s type were common knowledge;
the payoff from these contracts is called the public information benchmark. It is the first-
best ex ante payoff for the principal. Further, I describe the lowest payoffs supported by
an equilibrium in the game where only point-contracts can be offered and the game where
menu-contracts can be offered.
To focus on interesting cases, the following assumption is maintained throughout.
Assumption 1 piHs (a2)− piHs (a1) > piLs (a2)− piLs (a1).
This assumption states that the marginal product of effort is larger when the principal’s
type is H. It is a sufficient condition for the existence of a separating equilibrium, as long
as the type-H principal’s first-best effort level is a2.
3.1 The Public Information Benchmark
Suppose the principal’s type is public information. For each effort level a ∈ A, the principal
of type i ∈ {H,L} chooses w to minimize pii(a) · w subject to AIC(ρ) and IR(ρ) where
ρi = 1. Denote the solution to this problem by w∗i(a). The principal then chooses the effort
a that maximizes pii(a) · (q−w∗i(a)). Denote this effort by a∗i. Let w∗i := w∗i(a∗i) and
v∗i := pii(a∗i) · (q−w∗i).
3.2 Lower Bound Equilibrium Point-Contract Payoff
The lower bound point-contract payoff is obtained when the principal chooses (w, a) to
maximize pii(a) · (q−w) subject to AIC(0, 1) and IR(0, 1); that is, both principal types
choose a contract to maximize profit subject to constraints that assume the agent puts
probability one on the event that the principal’s type is L.7 This equilibrium is supported
7If the choice of effort is the same for both principal types, each will offer (w∗L, a∗L). In some cases,
the high type principal may find it profitable to induce effort a2 while the low type principal prefers a1;
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by agent beliefs that put probability one on the principal being type-L whenever a deviation is
observed. To see that this is an equilibrium, note that any incentive compatible, individually
rational deviation contract must, by definition, not be more profitable for the principal given
the agents belief.
3.3 Lower Bound Equilibrium Menu-Contract Payoff
In the spirit of Maskin and Tirole (1992) a menu-contract (wˆi, aˆi)i∈{H,L} is called a Rothchild-
Stiglitz-Wilson (RSW) contract if, for each type-i principal, it maximizes vi(w, a) subject to
IR(1, 0), IR(0, 1), AIC(1, 0), AIC(0, 1) and PIC(i, j) for i, j ∈ {H,L}.8 Let (wˆi, aˆi)i∈{H,L}
denote the RSW menu-contract and vˆi := vi(wˆi, aˆi) denote the RSW payoff.9
When menu-contracts are allowed, the RSW problem generates lower bound payoffs for
the type-i principal since the agent will accept any RSW contract regardless of her belief
about the type of the principal.10 To see this, note first that the RSW problem for the type-i
principal specifies an entire menu: a contract for each principal type j ∈ {H,L}. This menu
must be incentive compatible for every principal type j ∈ {H,L}, not just type-i. Finally,
this menu-contract must guarantee the agent her reservation payoff ex post and induce the
appropriate effort level regardless of the principal’s type. Thus, the agent will always accept
an RSW contract and exert the correct amount of effort. In any equilibrium in which the
type-i principal obtains a payoff less than vˆi, she can therefore deviate to her RSW contract
to obtain vˆi. Figure 1 displays RSW contracts for risk neutral agents.11
then the type-L principal offers (w∗L, a∗L) and the type-H principal offers (w∗L(a2), a2), that is, the type-L
optimal wage when effort is fixed at a2. Notice that if a wage profile satisfies AIC(0, 1) then it also satisfies
AIC(1, 0), since piHs (a2)−piHs (a1) > piLs (a2)−piLs (a1). Moreover, for any wage profile w that satisfies AIC(ρ)
for any ρ, it must be that ws > wf , since a2 > a1. Therefore, since pi
H(a2) > pi
L(a2), if a wage profile
satisfies IR(0, 1) then it also satisfies IR(1, 0).
8Rothchild-Stiglitz-Wilson is a reference to the similar least-cost-separating contracts developed in the
insurance models of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977).
9The RSW menu-contract always exists and is unique.
10In terms of Myerson (1983), any feasible solution to the RSW problem is safe. The RSW menu for the
type-i principal is her best safe menu.
11Due to the linearity of the principal’s indifference curves (in particular, the fact that they posses the
single crossing property) computing the RSW contract can be simplified, as I show in Lemma 1 in the
Appendix. This lemma extends Proposition 2 in Maskin and Tirole (1992).
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4 The Deficiency of Point-Contracts
The RSW equilibrium contract for the type-i principal earns her the lower bound menu-
contract equilibrium. The RSW payoff can be obtained using point-contracts: if sepa-
rating equilibria exist, it is the least-cost separating equilibrium. On the other hand, if
Assumption 1 is satisfied and the high type principal wants to induce high effort in equi-
librium, the RSW/least-cost-separating equilibrium is strictly better than the lower bound
point-contract.12 Essentially, whenever the principal is able to separate, there will be a
point-contract equilibrium payoff that is strictly worse than any menu-contract equilibrium
payoff.
One can show that if λ is close to one, both of the principal’s types prefer a pooling
contract to the least-cost-separating contract. Since the pooling contract is implementable
in point-contracts, this implies that the best point-contract is preferred to the worst menu-
contract. On the other hand, if λ is small, the type-H principal prefers the least-cost-
separating contract while the type-L principal prefers a pooling contract.13 I now establish
when a separating menu-contract equilibrium exists that is more profitable than the least-
cost-separating contract for the principal.
4.1 Separating Equilibria
Let PS and M S be the sets of ex ante equilibrium payoffs for the principal that can be
earned via separating point-contracts and separating menu-contracts respectively. Our next
result describes when M S is strictly higher than PS (except at the RSW payoff). I first
make the following assumptions.
Assumption 2 (a) piH(aˆH) · U(wˆH)− aˆH > U¯ ; and (b) v∗L < vL(w∗H , a∗H).
12Otherwise, one can show that menu- and point- contract equilibrium payoffs coincide.
13In this case, the pooling contract is not an equilibrium in menu-contracts because the type-H principal
gets a payoff that is lower than vˆH . Ex ante, the pooling contract may give a higher payoff than the least-
cost-separating contract. This demonstrates that a menu-contract is not a generalization of a point-contract.
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Part (a) of the assumption states that the agent earns more than her reservation utility when
the principal is type H under the least-cost-separating equilibrium. This holds, for example,









, and w∗Hs > w
∗H
f . Part (b) ensures that the first-best contract cannot
be implemented; in particular, in trying to do so, the type-L principal would try to mimic
the type-H principal. Thus, under this part, there is inefficiency in the least-cost-separating




is not too large or if u is linear.
I can now state the result.
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then PS and M S intersect only at the RSW
(or the least-cost separating) equilibrium payoff. Suppose Assumption 2 also holds. Then,
every v ∈M S \ {λvˆH + (1− λ)vˆL} is strictly greater than every z ∈PS if and only if
h
(
U¯ + a∗L − (a
∗L − a1)piLs (a2)
piLs (a2)− piLs (a1)
)
> w. (1)
Note that if w = −∞ then condition (1) is always satisfied.
Proof For the first statement, notice that, by definition, the best separating point-contract
is the least-cost-separating point-contract; this gives the principal precisely the payoff of
the RSW menu-contract, i.e. the lower-bound equilibrium menu-contract payoff. All other
point-contracts will give the principal a (weakly) lower payoff and all other menu-contracts
will give the principal a (weakly) higher payoff.
For sufficiency of the second statement, first suppose the a∗L = a2. The left hand side
of (1) is the wage that the type-L principal pays to the agent in the public information
benchmark if the agent fails: i.e. w∗Lf := h
(
U¯ + a2 − (a2−a1)piLs (a2)piLs (a2)−piLs (a1)
)
is the unique wf that is
part of the solution to
piL(a2) ·U(w) = U¯ + a2 (2)
(piL(a2)− piL(a1)) ·U(w) = a2 − a1. (3)
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Recall that these equations are sufficient (given appropriately chosen w∗H) for w∗L to be an
equilibrium wage profile for the type L principal since only the agent’s downward incentive





piH(a2) ·U(wˆH)− a2 − U¯
]
> 0
by Assumption 2.14 Separation in the RSW equilibrium requires that the type-H principal
offer a contract that is more expensive than the first-best contract in order to dissuade the
type-L principal from mimicking her, thus generating a payoff higher than the reservation
utility for the agent in the type-H task. Since individual rationality only needs to be satisfied
in expectation for menu-contracts, I can “transfer” these rents ceded to the agent from the
principal of type-H to the principal of type-L, essentially relaxing her individual rationality
constraint by ∆. The type-L principal’s menu-contract wage can therefore be solved as the
unique solution to (3) and
piL(a∗L) ·U(w) = U¯ + a∗(L)−∆ (4)
To show that the resulting set of wage profiles is cheaper for the principal, it is useful to
use conditions (2), (3) and (4) to write wf as a function of ws we have
wLf (ws;AIC) := h
(
U(ws)− a2 − a1
(piLs (a2)− piLs (a1))
)
wLf (ws; IR) := h
(
U¯ + a2 − piLs (a2)U(ws)
piLf (a2)
)
wLf (ws; IR∆) := h
(
U¯ + a2 −∆− piLs (a2)U(ws)
piLf (a2)
)
Fix the type H principal’s contract at (wˆH , a2). Note that the public information wage for
the type-L principal w∗L is defined such that wLf (w
∗L




s ;AIC) = w
∗L
f . Let w˜
L
14The quantity ∆ is chosen so that the type-L principal extracts all of the agent’s ex ante surplus.
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be the solution to wLf (ws; IR∆) = w
L
f (ws;AIC) if w˜f (L) ≥ w and w˜L := (w,wLf (w; IR∆))
otherwise. Since wLf (·;AIC) is increasing15 and wLf (·, IR∆) < wLf (·, IR) , w˜L ≤ w∗L. Thus,
w˜L implements a2 at a lower cost than w
∗L. If vˆH ≥ piH(a2)(q − w˜L), then I am finished.
Otherwise, choose w˜L such that vˆH = piH(a2)(q− w˜L). This set of wage profiles is cheaper








f . Thus, the principal is strictly better off ex ante.
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If a∗L = a1, then w∗Lf = w
∗L
s = h(U¯ + a1). Let z = min{U¯ + a1 − ∆, w}. Then w˜Lf =
w˜Ls = h(z) implements a1 in menu-contracts. As before at w˜
L, the constraint PIC(L,H) is
relaxed (since the type-L principal now implements a∗L at a lower cost and therefore receives
a higher payoff) and therefore the type-H principal can implement her effort at a lower cost.
Thus, both types of the principal are strictly better off.




s ;AIC) = w . But then,
since wLf (·;AIC) is strictly increasing (see footnote 15), there is no w˜s that implements a∗L
such that w˜s < w
∗L
s , even for the relaxed individual rationality constraint. So the least cost
contract that implements a∗L remains (w∗Ls , w).
To see why sufficiency holds graphically, in the case where a∗L = a2, observe Figure 1.
Note that the function wif (ws;AIC) represents the failure wage that makes the agent indif-
ferent between exerting effort a2 and effort a1 if her success wage is ws and she knows that
the principal is of type i ∈ {H,L}; to induce effort a2, contracts must be to the right of this
function in (ws, wf )-space. The function w
i
f (ws; IR) represents the failure wage that makes
the agent indifferent between participating and not if her success wage is ws and she knows
the principal is of type i ∈ {H,L}; individually rational contracts are above this function in
(ws, wf )-space.
The function wif (ws; IR∆) is similarly the failure wage that makes the agent indifferent
between participating and not if her success wage is ws and she knows the principal is of
15 Note that wL
′
f (ws;AIC) = h
′
(
U(ws)− a2−a1(piLs (a2)−piLs (a1))
)
U ′(ws) > 0.



























vL(w, a∗(L)) = v∗(L)
ws
wf
(b) Condition (1) is violated.
Figure 1: Illustration of Proposition 1.
type i ∈ {H,L} and reservation utility is U¯ − ∆. The individual rationality constraint for
the type-L principal effectively shifts down by some ∆ > 0 (the red dashed line in Figure
1 (a)) making the less expensive contract w˜L available to her. Thus, using menu-contracts,
the principal can squeeze more rent from the agent by eliminating the slack in the agent’s
ex ante individual rationality constraint and transferring it across states in order to preserve
her own incentive compatibility. This can be done so long as there are wage profiles that are
less expensive than the RSW wage profile and are above w (i.e. condition (1) is satisfied).
This is not an option using point-contracts since individual rationality must be satisfied ex
post for separating contracts.
5 Conclusion
I have shown when allowing the principal to offer menu-contracts instead of point-contracts
can increase the set of equilibrium payoffs and eliminate many poor equilibria for the prin-
cipal. Additionally, I have characterized environments where equilibrium payoffs can be
obtained using separating menu-contracts that are strictly higher than any separating equi-
librium payoff using point-contracts. The results in this paper offer a useful guide to when the
complexities of menu-contract equilibria can and cannot be safely ignored in moral hazard
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environments with an informed principal.
A natural question is whether menu-contracts are or can be used in practice. As noted
by Segal and Whinston (2003), such contracts are rare but exist. They cite the example of a
publishing company (the principal) retaining an option to cease publishing a book with the
obligation to then return the copyright to the author (the agent). The hidden information
of the publisher may be the stock of books competing with the author’s for the publisher’s
promotional resources and attention: a book, regardless of the effort put into it, will more
likely be a success if it is well promoted. The author decides whether to enter a contract
with the publisher before learning her chances of success. Alternatively, any project-based
employment offer that depends, at least implicitly, on the difficulty as well as the success
of a project could be viewed as a menu-contract. As an example, return to the law firm
introduced above. When hiring a new associate, a firm is unlikely to be precise about the
type of cases that will be assigned but clear in stating (possibly implicitly) that rewards for
more difficult cases are more highly powered than those of easy cases.
An important dimension of principal-agent relationships not explored here is repeated
interaction. It is possible that a principal can use actions in a long-term relationship to signal
the productivity of effort more cheaply than in the one-shot game with point-contracts. On
the other hand, Beaudry (1994) demonstrates that in a two-shot game with point-contracts,
such signalling is still costly, therefore leaving a role for menu-contracts to improve the
principal’s profits.
A Appendix: Proofs
Lemma 1 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. The RSW equilibrium is the least-cost separating






H) · (q−wH) s.t. IR(1, 0), AIC(1, 0) and PIC(L,H).





be a solution to IRSW . First, I claim that the constraint AIC (1, 0) in
problem IRSW must bind. Suppose AIC (1, 0) holds with strict inequality and let piHs ≥ piHf .
Then, decrease wHs and increase w
H
f slightly to (w˜
H
s − s, w˜Hf + f ) for small s, f > 0 so
that IR (1, 0) and AIC (1, 0) still hold. Since piHs > pi
L
s , (s, f ) can be chosen such that
the right hand side of PIC(L,H) (possibly weakly) decreases while the objective function
strictly increases. If piHs < pi
H
f , increase w
H
s and decrease w
H




f −f ) for




s , (s, f ) can again
be chosen such that the right hand side of PIC(L,H) (possibly weakly) decreases while the
objective function strictly increases.
Second, I claim that
(
(w˜H , a˜H), (w∗L, a∗L)
)
is incentive compatible. This is vacuously true
for the type-L principal since PIC(L,H) is imposed in problem IRSW and w∗L is incentive
compatible for the agent by construction. Further, AIC(1, 0) is imposed in problem IRSW .
It remains to show that
piH(a˜H) · (q− w˜H) ≥ piH(a∗L) · (q−w∗L) . (5)
I claim that (5) holds with strict inequality. Note that the curve in (ws, wf ) space implicitly





U(w˜Hs )− U(w˜Hf )
]
= a˜H − a1,
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U(w∗Ls )− U(w∗Lf )
]
= a∗L − a1
due to Assumption 1. Further, the indifference curves of the type-H principal are steeper
than the type-L principal’s. Therefore, the indifference curves possess the single crossing
property. If PIC(L,H) holds with equality, w˜H lies to the north-west of w∗L in (ws, wf )-
space which implies that (5) strictly holds. Otherwise, w˜H = w∗H and (5) strictly holds
since piHs (a
∗H) > piLs (a
∗L).




solves the latter problem and satisfies all the constraints of the former (with the type-L









. Similarly, the RSW problem for the type-L principal





problem and satisfies all the constraints of the former (with the type-H contract specified
as (wˆ∗H , a∗H)). Therefore it solves the RSW problem for the type-L principal.
To see that this menu-contract exists I first claim that w∗L(a) exists for any a. For a = a1,
w∗L(a) = (h(U¯ + a1), h(U¯ + a1)). For a = a2, the constraints AIC(0, 1) and IR(a2; {0, 1})
will be satisfied with equality. Since wLf (·; IR) is strictly decreasing and wLf (·;AIC) is strictly
increasing, they must intersect exactly once in R2. Denote this intersection point (w′s, w′f ).
If (w′s, w
′
f ) ∈ [w,∞)2 I am done: w∗L = (w′s, w′f ). Otherwise, the solution is w∗L = (w′′s , w)




s , AIC) = w. If the type-L principal is indifferent between a1 and
a2, set a
∗L = a2.
IRSW can be broken down into separate problems of minimizing the cost of implementing
each effort then choosing most profitable effort. Note that a∗H = a1 implies that a∗L = a1
since the expected payoff from the agent’s effort is strictly higher for they type-H principal.
Thus if a∗H = a1, wˆH = (h(U¯ + a1), h(U¯ + a1)) which satisfies all the constraints of IRSW
17
given our previous statement.
If a∗H = a2 and PIC(L,H) does not bind, the solution to IRSW is simply w∗H , which
exists by an argument analogous to the previous one for the existence of w∗L. Otherwise,
the solution to IRSW is defined by
(
piHs (a2)− piHs (a1)
) (
U(wˆHs )− U(wˆHf )
)




) · (q−w∗L) = piL(a2) · (q− wˆH) . (7)
Equation (6) implicitly defines a strictly increase line in (ws, wf )-space while equation (7)
defines a strictly decreasing line in (ws, wf )-space. These lines therefore intersect exactly
once in R2. Denote this intersection point (w′s, w′f ). If this (w′s, w′f ) ∈ [w,∞)2 I am done:
w˜H = (w′s, w
′
f ) . Otherwise, the solution is w
∗L = (w′′s , w) where w
′′
s satisfies equation (6)
with wˆHf = w.
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